p4. Berger states 3 key processes that occur during world construction: (1) Externalization: "the ongoing outpouring of human activity onto the world" (2) Objectivation: "the attainment by the products of this activity (again both physical AND mental) of a reality that confronts its original producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves (3) internalization: "the re-appropriation by men of this same reality, transforming it once again from the structure of the objective world into structures of subjective consciousness"
p5. Berger claims that there is a biological process of "becoming man" in the sense of developing personality and appropriating culture. This makes me pause. Hearing that there is a biological process going on in appropriate culture is difficult to imagine. But I guess I see his point: that the body-mind development process is inseparable from and develops in a cultural situation. He is making a claim that culture is not superimposed as alien mutation upon the biological development of man. This seems to point to German holism of the kind that Goldstein was working in. Then again he is the only one I know of to root man's development to actualizing potentialities in the psychosomatic situation. So the dividing line between culture (humanities) and biology (hard science) is not as sharp as it first seems. Berger then builds his argument for world construction on a re-imagined basis of science that seeks to move beyond the 19th century based science in order to make objective or empirical claims.
p5. He continues on to make the argument that "man has a double relationship with the world": Man is both in a world that antedates his appearance but also must make a world for himself" Interesting. Its clear that berger is arguing for a dialectic relationship (He has said as much) between man and society: they both contribute to each other's development (Sui Genesis). Importantly, he continues on to state that "the world building activity of man, therefore, is not a biologically extraneous phenomenon, but a direct consequence of man's biological constitution." This is not a cause effect relationship; rather it is dialectic: man's mind and personality, which are rooted in man's biology, is shaped by culture and society that man was instrumental in building. It is the hegelian dialectic, which he mentions in his notes. (note: in the beginning of the paragraph he mentions that it is man's instinctual structure that is "unspecialized". Presumably then with Freud this instinctual structure emanating from man's biological constitution is what is shaped by culture and differientiates man from the animal world as man "tames" his instincts. So in a sense, not with Freud as he would have not separated us so strongly from the animal world. Will this have consequences for Bergers later arguments on the nature of the sacred canopy?)
p6. Berger argues that man specializes his drive in the act or activity of building culture. Culture is the structure that provides stability for the instincts, which comports with the Freudian view of the function of culture. Culture then is a stabilizing force directed at an inherently unstable thing: the unconscious from which the instincts express themselves. He then goes on to say "the cultural imperative of stability and the inherent character of culture as unstable together posit the fundamental problem of man's world building activity" Thought: It is clear that berger is bringing in both psychology, biology and philosophical methods to construct his argument. I guess that is why abzug assigned the book. It also opens up the book to criticism: if any of the predominant basic viewpoints come under fire, so will berger's argument (i.e., the criticism of instinct theory). This will be something to keep in mind while reading.
p7. Berger defines society as an element of culture in that it is non-material culture that regulates man's relations with fellow man. He goes on to say "What appears at any particular historical moment as "human nature" is itself a product of man's world-building activity" Earlier on, he asserts that there is no fundamental human nature outside of the fact that it is in the "nature of man" to produce a world. What are the implications of this for Maslow's project to develop a new vision of human nature in the 1960s? I guess it means that in the 1960's Maslow and his cohorts were trying to do is build a wholly new world and human nature. This is then an element of the radical humanism of the 1960s (cite Rossinow). But Berger. sees this as a historically bounded enterprise saying more about the historical circumstances, than actually pointing to an unchanging human nature. What were those historical circumstances then? What would this new psychological world look like (Insert the Maslow quote on Psychologist "saving" the world). First off, Freudian theory was in decline as the central organizing paradigm (think Kuhn) of psychology and psychotherapy [Explain the decline of Freud - find a reference source]. This would have created and opening for other theories to fill the void. Maslow saw himself as such a Theorist (I am epi-Freudian; I can purify Freud). What is interesting is that his theory was selected and enshrined in the popular american consciousness of how they viewed themselves. Why was it selected? Along with existentialism, Maslow's theory of Self-actualization came to have organizing power over how individuals thoughts of their inner lives and motivations. Instead of looking to understand childhood conflicts (strengthen your description of these conflicts - are they infantile?), American's began to look at what level they existed on the hierarchy of needs, what they needed to do to move to the next level and utimately what they needed to do to reach self-actualization. This was a reassertion of the rationality of human needs: discrete actions were now possible to reach a state of perfection that was absent in Freudian thought. In Fruedian thought, the best one could hope for is a more or less stable ego capable of managing the dual demands of the instincts and of culture. Under the theory of Self actualization, such conflicts had solutions [elaborate on the solutions]. But culture and society did have to align correctly to allow this new human being the chance to self-actualize: belongingness needs must be met through a loving family and society; individuals must receive the proper self-esteem and encouragement from a good enough world; food and safety needs must be consistently provided for . So the question before Maslow was: what kind of culture and society is needed to allow self-actualization to occur. In more practical moments, Maslow expressed a less sanguine view of the cultural situation of the 1960s: he stated that only about 1% of people actually reach a constant state of self-actualization [Cite this][Discuss Maslow uneasy relationship with Fromm = Sane Society, Marcuse=Eros and Civilization]. What were the hopes of the culture? One answer is represented by thinkers such as Marcuse and Fromm. Maslow had an uneasy relationship and expressed his frustration about Marcuse [ See hoffman for this] Discuss Eros and Civilization here in the thesis. [Break] One can imagine that top companies adopted this theory of motivation because it gave them a schema for which to structure programs to attract the best and the brightest, provide for their basic needs in exchange for their labor, and symbiotically promote the growth of both the individual and the company. Self actualization became a new ideal, a new american subjectivity devoid of the pessimism of Freud. Second, would be the religious and therapeutic experimentation that was occurring [Get sources and details]. The world that Maslow and humanistic psychology were trying to create was different than a wholly new political order of which much scholarship has been written [Rossinow, Gitlan, Farber, Isserman, and Kazin, others?]. They focused on building a new subjectivity, a new interiority that was devoid of the inner conflict which possessed most people [cite Phillip Reiff quote about conquering the inner life]. They sought to overcome the Freudian opposition between the individual and culture through constructing both a new psychology and a new culture that was permissive well beyond sexual freedom and ultimately free of repression. These new seekers of a peaceful inner life sought authenticity and encounter [Maslow was both a theorist and participant in this seeking - what passages exemplify this striving for integration and peace. How can you craft this from his journal and letters? In this sense this is the craft of biography. Reading Cosmos Crumbling will be helpful because it employs biographical vignettes to make the argument for cosmological thinking]. They looked past the Freudian model of mind working under condition of pain [Insert footnote on Jonathan lear]. Its funny to me that out of this context the drug therapies of today developed. So plan to discuss berger in the SA chapter.
p8. Berger states that the "stuff out of which society and all its formations are made is human meanings externalized by human activity"...So institutionalization and professionalization are the activity by which human meanings as concerns disciplines are made. So if the human meanings change, so do the externalizations (the family, the economy, the state). This then means that great revolutions are first and foremost revolutions in ideas and human meaning. Without a change in meaning, no change in "external" society is possible. This lends credence to the idea that historical moments of change are preceded by a revolution in ideas [Kuhn]. This is marxian theory at its clearest. But what about the idea of an revolution of the soul? An inner revolution? And I mean soul in the greek sense of psyche or mind - that phenomena which is the product of culture, biology and history, both personal and extra-personal. These psychologist in the 1960 embarked on such a task. It did not run counter to the political movements in the 1960s as some have claimed [Cite examples from Rossinow]; rather it complemented them. Maslow's theories then were both an expression of this revolution of the soul as well as a part of the vanguard. [List other revolutionary works: Sane Society, Eros and Civilization, Discovery of Being, Courage to Be, Existentialist Literature, etc]
p. 8 Berger claims that "Society, then, is a product of man, rooted in the phenomenon of externalization, which in turn is grounded in the very biological constitution of man", This comports with the Freudian saying that "culture obeys an inner erotic impulse". Culture and society then have their roots in biology according to these theorists. But Freud has a different emphasis. He asserts that man is not so far from the animal world [find citation] whereas Berger on page 5 says that "the non-human animal enters the world with highly specialized and firmly directed drives. As a result, it lives in a world that is more or less completely determined by its instinctual structures. This world is closed in terms of its possibilities, programmed, as it were, by the animals own constitution. Consequently, each animal, lives in an environment that is specific to its particular species. There is a mouse-world, a dog-world, a horse-world, and so forth". So Berger's theory rests on instinct theory. Thus criticisms that apply to instinct theory will apply to berger's analysis. Assuming that Berger over-emphasizes the distance between man and animal (i.e., some higher Apes may be thought of to have culture), what implications does this have for his theory? Does his theory rest on this distance between man and animal being as large as he claims? Probably not. The key here is that culture springs from man's biological nature - something that does have large implications. Is there a cultural genetic sequence? If the underlying theory of biology changes, then the ground of Berger's analysis becomes more shaky. So if I want to criticize Berger, look up criticisms of instinct theory. In fact, I believe Goldstein has such a criticism. All in all, I'm uncomfortable with Berger's assertion, but not Freud's. Why? Freud's assertion makes sense to me on an experiential basis: I see the attachment that so quickly develops between individual, I feel its power in my own life, I can't help but caring about people, above all my parents. Berger is saying that instincts or biology propel us to act. This activity is externalization - we literally take what is inside us and pour it out into the world: jumping, fight, loving, hating, breaking, building. In the process of that we become attached, build somewhat stable relationships, stay in them, presto-bingo: society and culture.
p. 9 Berger discusses culture and subjectivity: "Although all culture originates and is rooted in the subjective consciousness of human beings, once formed it cannot be reabsorbed into consciousness at will. It stands outside the subjectivity of the individual as, indeed, a world". Here he begins to make his argument for the objective nature of culture. It is based off of the observation that: culture, once created, cannot be reabsorbed into consciousness. What are the implications of this for subjectivity? What philosophical traditions is he addressing here? The Cartesian cogito? Are there flaws in this argument? Why does it give me pause? I guess because it is dialectical thinking which is foreign to the causal thinking I am so used to. I also have this funny feeling that there is a hidden argument against the radical subjectivity espoused by the existentialists or the cartesian idea that it is impossible to know other minds or have knowledge of the world outside your own mind. In a sense, Berger is making the argument for the realness of objectivity in regards to culture. In other words, culture is not relative or subjective at any given moment in time. It has an objective feel and definite dimensions. However, culture is subject to change as subjective consciousness changes over time. In that sense, culture changes with the things that shift subjective consciousness: primarily historical events be they intellectual, social, technological, cultural or economic. Consequently then changes in subjective consciousness precede changes in culture and society. What then happens to the individual whose consciousness has shifted out of tune with his culture? His consciousness would then be alien to the culture of his fellowman. What about groups of individuals whose shared consciousness has shifted out of balance? What does this imply for theory of culture that berger is articulating? Is there ever a moment in history where culture is static or objective in the sense that Berger articulates? Wouldn't culture then be a competition between collectivities of shared consciousness? I'm certain in the present day it is clear that their are competing narratives to define the culture. Just think of the two main american political parties. But Berger does mention that culture is an unstable thing: "The cultural imperative of stability and the inherent character of culture as unstable together posit the fundamental problem of man's world-building activity" p6. So what does it mean then to call culture a "world"?
---Thoughts on reading and writing: Before ever approaching a book get a sense of how much time it will take to read and digest. My process is to write as I read, so necessarily, the more challenging the work, the more I am going to want to write to understand the work. This then should go into a prioritization scheme when balancing workload: work on a selection of books at the same time which balances, the difficult with the easy.
P 10 Berger answers my question: "to be in a culture means to share in a particular world of objectivities with others.". So what defines those objectivities especially in regards to subjective consciousness?
P 11 He does make an argument against the cogito: "Since society is encountered by the individual as a reality external to himself, it may often happen that it's workings remain opaque to his understanding. He cannot discover the meaning of a social phenomenon by introspection. He must, for this purpose, go outside himself and engage in the basically same kind of empirical inquiry that is necessary if he is to understand anything located outside of his own mind". On page 12 he define social phenomenon: "no human construction can accurately be called a social phenomenon unless it had achieved that measure of objectivity that compels the individual to recognize it as real". He gives language as the paradigmatic case.
P. 13 madness is his liminal point again: "what is more, the individual himself unless again he encloses himself in a solipsistic world of withdrawal from the common reality will seek to validate his self interpretations by comparing them with the objectively available coordinates of his biography."
P10 With Freud: "above all, society manifests itself by it's coercive power."
-- Thoughts on reading and writing -- Collect ideas in a notebook about a book. When writing refer back to your notes about the book.
